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From Legalized Business Ethics to
International Trade Regulation:
The Role of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act and Other
Transnational Anti-Bribery
Regulations in Fighting
Corruption in International Trade
by Eric C. Chaffee*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA)' has never had a
clearly defined place in American law. Part of the problem is the
enigmatic nature of the FCPA itself. Codified in scattered provisions
among the statutes of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange
Act),' the FCPA contains provisions requiring companies issuing
securities registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) to maintain both accurate books and records and adequate

* Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law. Ohio State University (B.A.,
1999); University of Pennsylvania Law School (J.D., 2002). Member, State Bar of Ohio.
I would like to thank Christine Gall, Esq. for her encouragement while drafting this
Article. I would also like to thank Dean Gary Simson, Professor Mark Jones, and the
editorial board of the MercerLaw Review for inviting me to participate in their Symposium
and to contribute to this Symposium issue. The views set forth in this Article are
completely my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of any employer or client either
past or present.
1. Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C. (2012)).
2. Pub. L. No. 291,48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78pp (2012)).
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internal accounting controls.? In addition, the FCPA also has provisions
rendering unlawful transnational bribery, in other words, bribes paid
directly and indirectly by individuals and entities residing or operating
in the United States to foreign public officials, foreign candidates for
office, and foreign political parties.' Although the purposes of all of the
provisions of the FCPA coalesce around the prevention, detection, and
punishment of transnational bribery, the divergent nature of these
provisions is apparent.
Adding to the enigmatic and elusive nature of the FCPA, the SEC is
principally charged with civil enforcement of the FCPA, and the
Department of Justice (DOJ) is charged with criminal enforcement.?
These two administrative agencies have very different mandates.'
Although one prominent and well-regarded securities regulation scholar
has sensibly argued for consolidation of enforcement of the FCPA antibribery provisions in the DOJ because enforcement of the FCPA antibribery provisions is outside of the SEC's traditional mandates,' the
chances of that occurring are unlikely, especially considering the creation
of an FCPA enforcement unit within the SEC in 2010.

3. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2XA) (requiring that every issuer of securities registered with the
SEC "make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately
and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer"), id.
§ 78m(b)(2XB)(i)-(iv) (mandating that every issuer of securities registered with the SEC
"devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls" sufficient to maintain
accurate books and records).
4. Id. § 78dd (rendering unlawful transnational bribery by issuers of securities
registered with the SEC); id. § 78dd-2 (rendering unlawful transnational bribery by
"domestic concerns"); id. § 78dd-3 (rendering unlawful transnational bribery by persons
other than registered issuers and domestic concerns).
5. Id. § 78u(d).
6. Id. §§ 78dd-1 to 78dd-3, § 78ff. Notably, the DOJ also has the power to civilly
enforce the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA. Id. § 78ff.
7. CompareAbout DOJ, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, www.justice.gov/about/about.html (last
visited Jan. 13, 2014) (stating that the mission of the DOJ is "[t1o enforce the law and
defend the interests of the United States according to the law; to ensure public safety
against threats foreign and domestic; to provide federal leadership in preventing and
controlling crime; to seek just punishment for those guilty of unlawful behavior, and to
ensure fair and impartial administration of justice for all Americans"), with What We Do,
U.S. SEC. &ExCH. CoMM'N, http*//www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Jan. 13,
2014) ("The mission of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission is to protect
investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.").
8. See generally Barbara Black, The SEC and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act:
Fighting Global CorruptionIs Not Partof the SEC's Mission, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1093, 1117
(2012) (arguing that enforcement of the FCPA should be consolidated in the DOJ because
fighting global corruption is outside of the SEC's traditional mandate).
9. SEC EnforcementActions: FCPA Cases, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, http://www.sec.
gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-cases.shtml (last visited Jan. 13, 2014) (reporting that FCPA
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Adding to the confusion over the place of the FCPA in American law
is the fact that the legal academy has largely relegated it to the
peripheries of highly specialized upper level elective courses, and the
FCPA resides on the boundaries of the subject-matter areas commonly
employed in American legal education. Most basic business law and
criminal law texts make no mention of the FCPA,10 and the authors of
securities regulation and white collar crime books largely ignore the
FCPA with the assumption that it will be covered elsewhere."
Although, as will be explored in the pages of this Article, the FCPA
should be discussed in international trade regulation casebooks, many
law schools curiously fail to offer this type of course regularly, despite
the increasing importance of international trade. When international
trade regulation courses are offered, the FCPA is almost never mentioned in the syllabi.12
Part of the reason for the lack of a defined place and purpose for the
FCPA is the relatively recent interest in FCPA enforcement. When

enforcement "continues to be a high priority area for the SEC" and noting the creation of
the SEC's Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Unit in 2010).
10. Many of the best written and most highly regarded business law textbooks make
no mention of the FCPA in their indices. See, e.g., MELVIN ARON EISENBERG & JAMEs D.
Cox, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS (10th
ed. 2011); WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, AND
CORPORATIONS (8th ed. 2012); CHARLES R.T. O'KELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON,
CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS (6th ed. 2010).
Similarly, many of the best written and most highly regarded criminal law textbooks make
no mention of the FCPA in their indices either. See, e.g., KATE E. BLOCH & KEVIN C.
McMUNIGAL, CRIMINAL LAW: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH: CASES, STATUTES, AND
PROBLEMS (2005); JOSHUA DRESSLER & STEPHEN P. GARVEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CRIMINAL LAw (6th ed. 2012); PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW: CASE STUDIES &
CONTROVERSIES (3d ed. 2012).
11. Many of the best written and most highly regarded textbooks used in white collar
crime classes make little to no mention of the FCPA. See, e.g., NORMAN ABRAMS ET AL.,
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAw AND ITS ENFORCEMENT (5th ed. 2010); KATHLEEN F. BRICKEY,
CORPORATE AND WHITE COLLAR CRIME: CASES AND MATERIALS (4th ed. 2006); MICHAEL L.
SEIGEL, WHITE COLLAR CRIME: LAw, PROCEDURE, THEORY, PRACTICE (2011); J. KELLY
STRADER & SANDRA D. JORDAN, WHITE COLLAR CRIME: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS
(2d ed. 2009). In addition, many of the best written and most highly regarded securities
regulation textbooks contain only limited reference to the FCPA within their pages. See,
e.g., STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND ANALYSIS
(3d ed. 2012); JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & HILARY A. SALE, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS (12th ed. 2012); JAMES D. COx, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS
(6th ed. 2009); THOMAS LEE HAZEN, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS (7th
ed. 2006).
12. See also infra notes 30-34 (reporting that Daniel C.K. Chow and Thomas J.
Schoenbaum do not focus on the FCPA within the pages of their leading textbook on
international trade regulation).
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Congress enacted the FCPA in 1977, it was the first statute of its kind
in the world."3 Since a "quiet" period that lasted until the beginning
of the 2000s, FCPA enforcement has exploded,' based in large part on
a growing interest around the globe in fighting corruption and based
upon the promulgation of transnational anti-corruption treaties and
statutes that now blanket much of the world."
In addition, the enigmatic nature of the FCPA is compounded by the
fact that the justifications and purposes for a robust system of transnational anti-corruption regulation have evolved, shifted, and morphed. As
will be discussed in this Article, Congress promulgated the FCPA as a
means of legalizing business ethics and to address foreign policy
concerns.' 6 As a result of globalization, however, the FCPA and other
transnational anti-corruption regulations have now become a necessity
for improving global economic efficiency, advancing the rule of law, and
policing international trade."
Although many in practice now realize the importance of the FCPA
and other transnational anti-corruption regulations in international
trade regulation," the legal academy needs to do more to acknowledge
this reality. This Article advances the existing scholarship in three main

13. See Andrew Brady Spalding, Unwitting Sanctions: UnderstandingAnti-Bribery
Legislation as Economic SanctionsAgainst Emerging Markets, 62 FLA. L. REV. 351, 353
(2010) (stating that when Congress enacted the FCPA in the 1970s, it was the "first statute
of its kind").
14. See John Ashcroft & John Ratcliffe, The Recent and Unusual Evolution of an
Expanding FCPA, 26 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHIcs & PUB. POL'Y 25, 27 (2012) ("[The total
number of FCPA cases brought by the DOJ and SEC from 2007 to 2009 more than doubled
the total of all such cases brought in the statute's first 30 years."); Peter J. Henning,
Taking Aim at the Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Apr. 30, 2012,
1:55 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/30/taking-aim-at-the-foreign-corrupt-prac
tices-act ("For the first 30 years or so after its enactment, the antibribery portion of [the
FCPA] was used sporadically.... Prosecutors have now made enforcement of the law a
priority, and more industries have been caught up in investigations."); see also Mike
Koehler, Big, Bold, and Bizarre: The Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct Enters a New Era, 43
U. TOL. L. REV. 99, 100 (2011) (reporting that "FCPA enforcement data from 2010 best
demonstrates the emergence of the new era of enforcement.").
15. See infra Part II.C (discussing the current international architecture of transnational anti-corruption regulation).
16. See infra Part II.B (exploring the policy concerns that most prominently played a
role in the passage of the FCPA).
17. See infra Part II.B (explaining that the justifications for the FCPA and other
transnational anti-corruption regulations have now shifted to improving economic efficiency
and policing international trade).
18. See, e.g., Stephen Clayton, Top Ten Basics of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Compliance for the Small Legal Department, Ass'N OF CORP. CouNs. (June 1, 2011),
http://www.ace.com/legalresources/publications/topten/SLD-FCPA-Compliance.cfm.
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ways: First, it clarifies and highlights the underappreciated role of the
FCPA and other transnational anti-corruption laws in international
trade regulation. Second, it explains the evolution and transformation
of the justifications for the FCPA and other transnational anti-corruption
regulations from the legalization of business ethics to the promotion of
economic efficiency and the rule of law in international trade regulation.
Third, it explores the emerging importance of transnational anticorruption law as a component of international trade regulation.
The remainder of this Article is structured as follows: Part II provides
a discussion of transnational anti-bribery regulation as a component of
international trade law and explains the shift in the justification for the
FCPA and other transnational anti-corruption laws from the legalization
of business ethics to the promotion of economic efficiency and the rule of
law by way of international trade regulation. Part III discusses the
consequences of the FCPA and other transnational anti-corruption law
being a source of international trade regulation, including the need for
the World Trade Organization (WTO) to increase its role in fighting
corruption, the need for the enforcement of the anti-bribery provisions
of the FCPA to be consolidated in the DOJ, and the need for the creation
of an international body to address corruption-related issues. Finally,
Part IV contains brief concluding remarks, which focus on the need for
the legal academy to place more focus on transnational corruption law
as a component of international trade law.
II.

TRANSNATIONAL ANTI-BRIBERY REGULATION AS A COMPONENT OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW

Although the FCPA could be viewed as fitting within a myriad of
different areas of the law in the United States, such as business law,
criminal law, securities regulation, and the law governing international
business transactions, this Article argues that the FCPA and other
transnational anti-corruption regulations should be viewed as components of international trade law. In this part, the definition of international trade law, the origins of the FCPA, and the development of the
global system of transnational anti-corruption law will be explored. In
addition, the reasons why transnational anti-corruption regulation
should be viewed as a component of international trade law will be
examined.

A.

The Definition of International'Rade Law

The place to begin in understanding the role of the FCPA and other
transnational anti-corruption regulations in international trade law is
with the definition of international trade law itself. The simplest
definition of the term might be any and all laws and regulations that
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impact international trade. Even though such a definition is attractive
because it entails the spectrum of all things that might constitute
internationaltradelaw, international trade scholars, as will be discussed
below, typically take a more nuanced and refined approach to defining
the term because of the wide variety of laws and regulations that impact
international trade. Although considerable ambiguity exists in the
definition of internationaltrade law, the FCPA and other transnational
anti-corruption regulations should fit within its ambit based on the
integral part these regulations play in governing how trade is conducted.
Professors Daniel Chow and Thomas Schoenbaum have explored the
definition of internationaltrade law in their casebook on the subject."
Importantly, they acknowledge that the term is ambiguous and can be
defined in a variety of different ways.o In their writing, they discuss
three main definitions for the term, and each will be discussed below.21
First, Professors Chow and Schoenbaum write, "[Iun English law,
[internationaltrade law] commonly means the private law of international business and commercial transactions."22 Even though this
definition has some appeal, it does not entail the wide range of
regulations that impact international trade because it ignores any
impact on international trade by public national law and public
international law. At best, this type of definition only covers the law
governing international business transactions, while excluding much of
the law that traditionally governs international trade. Although the
FCPA and other transnational anti-corruption laws have a role to play
at the peripheries of this definition because public officials are involved
in the passage and enforcement of the private law governing business
and commercial transactions, one would have difficulty making the
argument under this definition, that the FCPA and other transnational
anti-corruption regulations would be considered internationaltrade law.
Additionally, one would have a hard time arguing that most of the law
traditionally viewed as international trade regulation in the United
States would fit within this definition. Importantly (and sensibly), Chow
and Schoenbaum dismiss this definition as being insufficient because of
its narrow scope."

19. DANIEL C.K CHOW & THOMAs J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 1
(2008).

20. Id. ("The term 'law of international trade' has different meanings to different
people.").
21.
22.

Id.
Id.

23. See id.
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Second, Chow and Schoenbaum report, "For some American lawyers,
on the other hand, the law of international trade is usually understood
to refer to U.S. statutes and cases under which the federal government
regulates trade, business, and international investment with other
countries."' Although this definition has some appeal, it is oddly
fixated on the law of the United States to define an area of international
regulation. Further, the definition fails to include any private or public
international law and completely ignores the regulations on international trade adopted by other nations in their domestic laws. Chow and
Schoenbaum also summarily dismiss this definition."
Third and finally, Chow and Schoenbaum define internationaltrade
law as "the public international law treaties and legal institutions that
constitute the multilateral trading system and the implementation of
these public international law obligations into domestic law."26 This
definition is also likely under inclusive. The "multilateral trading
system" is the system set up under the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) 7 to govern international trade in the wake of World
War II, which is currently overseen by the WTO.2 8 Under this definition of the "multilateral trading system," the FCPA and other transnational anti-corruption regulations are likely excluded from the definition
of internationaltrade law offered by Chow and Schoenbaum. As will be
explained below, however, transnational anti-corruption regulation has
come to blanket the globe as a result of numerous international
agreements and the requirements within those agreements that parties
adopt provisions similar to the FCPA into their domestic law.2 9 As a
result, it is almost beyond peradventure that the FCPA and other
transnational anti-corruption laws should be considered international
trade regulation because these provisions are integral to how trade is
conducted and will be conducted for the foreseeable future.
Notably, Chow and Schoenbaum do not focus on the FCPA and other
transnational anti-corruption regulations within the pages of their
international trade law casebook.o This is understandable for four

24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S.
194.
28. See The Multilateral Trading System-Past, Present and Future, WORLD TRADE
ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/inbrief e/inbr0_e.htm (last visited
Jan. 13, 2014) (providing a brief overview of the history of the multilateral trading system).
29. See infra Part II.C (discussing the various international agreements that require
parties to adopt provisions into their domestic law prohibiting transnational corruption).
30. See generally CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 19.
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reasons. First, the international agreements requiring the prohibition
of transnational corruption fall outside of what is traditionally considered to be the multilateral trading system." Even if this is the case,
transnational anti-corruption regulation has such an impact on trade
that it should be considered international trade regulation. Second, the
WTO, which is the primary body governing international trade, has done
little to directly confront issues relating to corruption, even though
transparency in trade is part of its mandate." Third, as will be
discussed in the next part, the current international architecture of
transnational anti-corruption law has been built only within the past
two decades, which means that the FCPA and other transnational anticorruption regulations have only recently begun to fall within the
definition of internationaltrade law because the impact of this regulation on trade has only been felt relatively recently." Fourth, because
of the wide array of topics that fall within the definition of international
trade law offered by Chow and Schoenbaun, they have chosen to allow
the FCPA and other transnational anti-corruption regulations to be
covered elsewhere because of their multifaceted and enigmatic nature.'
With that said, this topic is likely to become a fixture in most, if not all,
international trade law texts authored in the future because of the
growing interest around the globe in the regulation and enforcement of
transnational anti-corruption law.
In sum, transnational anti-corruption law is internationaltrade law.
As will be explained in the remainder of this part, the current international architecture of transnational anti-corruption law has reached
maturity with a variety of international agreements mandating that
parties adopt transnational anti-corruption regulation.3 5 Regardless of
the definition of internationaltrade law employed, these international
agreements and the laws promulgated as a result of them will impact
how trade is conducted internationally. Moreover, although the FCPA
was originally passed to address foreign policy concerns and to legalize
business ethics,36 the current global model of anti-corruption regulation

31. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
32. See infra Part UI.A (discussing the role of the World Trade Organization in fighting
corruption).
33. See infra Part II.B (discussing the origins of the FCPA).
34.

See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 19, at 105 & n. 1.

35. See infra Part H.C (discussing the numerous international agreements addressing
corruption that require parties to adopt provisions prohibiting and punishing transnational
bribery).
36. See infra Part II.B (discussing the origins of the FCPA and the rationales for its
adoption).
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has emerged, at least in part, to promote economic efficiency and the
rule of law in international trade."
The Origins of the Foreign CorruptPracticesAct of 1977
As previously mentioned, when Congress enacted the FCPA in the
mid-1970s, it was the first law of its kind in the world." Remarkably,
the FCPA did not start out as being primarily designed as international
trade regulation even though the enforcement of the FCPA has a
tremendous impact on how entities in the United States can conduct
trade internationally." The economic reasons for fighting corruption
were at best secondary or tertiary to Congress's primary purpose for
passing the FCPA.40 Understanding the story of the FCPA is essential
to understanding why the FCPA has transitioned from being a statute
primarily designed to legalize business ethics and to address foreign
policy concerns into a statute that is now a part of a robust global
system of transnational anti-corruption regulation that blankets much
of the world. In this part, the origins of the FCPA will be explored.
The FCPA finds its beginnings in efforts during the 1970s to increase
corporate accountability and integrity. During the Watergate hearings,
several corporate executives testified that corporate funds were used to
make illegal payments to Richard Nixon's election campaign." Stanley
Sporkin, who was Director of Enforcement at the SEC at the time, was
following the public reports of the hearings, and he questioned how
publicly traded companies could account for such illegal payments in
their books and records.4 2 Sporkin's curiosity eventually yielded a
formal investigation by the SEC of questionable and illegal payments
made by publicly traded corporations.4
The investigation deepened
concerns about the role that publicly traded companies in the United
States might be playing in corruption of public officials abroad."

B.

37. See infra Part II.C (discussing the numerous international agreements addressing
corruption and noting that each of them was created in part to address economic concerns).
38. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
39. See Clayton, supra note 18.
40. See generally Stanley Sporkin, The Worldwide Banning of Schmiergeld:A Look at
the Foreign CorruptPracticesAct on its Twentieth Birthday, 18 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BuS. 269,
271 (1998).
41. Id.
42. See id.
43. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. CommN, 94th CONG., REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND
PRACTICES (Comm. Print 1976).
44. Id. at 3 ("The [SEC] staff discovered falsifications of corporate financial records,
designed to disguise or conceal the source and application of corporate funds misused for
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One might argue that although the FCPA had its origins in business
ethics concerns arising from the Watergate hearings, the SEC's interest
was chiefly economic because of its congressional mandate to regulate
securities markets.45 In a certain regard, this view is correct, yet this
view is also shortsighted for a variety of reasons. First, the SEC's
mandate under the federal securities laws is designed to protect both
investors and securities markets." Although the SEC is interested in
protecting securities markets, its mandate also extends to protecting
investors by making sure that issuers behave ethically." Second, the
theory of market regulation employed under the Securities Act of 1933
(Securities Act)' and the Exchange Act is founded upon business
ethics. As held by the Supreme Court of the United States in SEC v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.,49 the "fundamental purpose"
behind both the Securities Act and the Exchange Act was to "substitute
a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and
thus to achieve a high standard of business ethics in the securities
industry."so Third, even if economic concerns originally in part
animated the passage of the FCPA, those concerns were at least initially
domestic economic concerns, rather than the global economic concerns
that have fueled the creation of the robust system of global anticorruption regulation that has rapidly developed in the past two decades."

iegal purposes, as well as the existence of secret 'slush funds' disbursed outside the
normal financial accountability system. These secret funds were used for a number of
purposes, including in some instances, questionable or illegal foreign payments. These
practices cast doubt on the integrity and reliability of the corporate books and records
which are the very foundation of the disclosure system established by the federal securities
laws.").
45. See What We Do, supra note 7 (discussing the "mission" of the SEC).
46. See Eric C. Chaffee, Beyond Blue Chip: Issuer Standing to Seek Injunctive Relief
Under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 Without the Purchaseor Sale of a Security, 36 SETON
HAIL L. REV. 1135, 1138-39 (2006) (reporting that federal securities law came into being
in the United States both to protect securities markets and to protect investors); Eric C.
Chaffee, Standing Under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5: The Continued Validity of the
ForcedSeller Exception to the Purchaser-SellerRequirement, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 843, 85152 (2009) (discussing the advent of federal securities regulation in the United States and
the purposes underlying the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934).
47. See Chaffee, Beyond Blue Chip, supranote 46, at 1139; What We Do, supra note 7
(discussing the "mission" of the SEC).
48. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2012).
49. 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
50. Id. at 186.
51. See infra Part II.C (discussing the numerous international agreements that have
been created to fight corruption and the mandates within those agreements to prohibit and
punish transnational corruption).
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Returning to the story of the origins of the FCPA, as the political
conversation progressed about the need for the FCPA, the discussion
morphed from one of business ethics and public disclosure into a
discussion of foreign policy. The SEC's concerns about corporate
accountability and integrity resulted in numerous congressional
hearings." The hearings conducted by the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations were especially important." Senator Frank Church,
who was chairing the proceedings, stated, 'The [SEC] is understandably
concerned that the disclosure requirements of U.S. laws are complied
with. This subcommittee is concerned with the foreign policy consequences of these payments by U.S. based multinational corporations."'
He
concluded his remarks by stating, "It is no longer sufficient to simply
sigh and say that is the way business is done. It is time to treat the
issue for what it is: a serious foreign policy problem."
Similar
statements were also being made in the United States House of
Representatives. For example, Representative Robert Nix, who chaired
a series of House hearings on questionable corporate payments to foreign
public officials, remarked, 'There has been a negative impact on our
foreign policy already because of these revelations .... The interference
in democratic elections with corporate gifts undermines everything we
are trying to do as a leader of the free world."56
At the time of the drafting and passage of the FCPA, the conversation
about improper corporate payments remained primarily focused on
foreign policy with some economic concerns mixed into the discussion.
For example, the Senate report on the legislation that would become the

52. See Mike Koehler, The Story of the Foreign CorruptPracticesAct, 73 OHIO ST. L.J.
929, 930-31 n.1 (2012) ("Between 1975 and 1977, Congress held numerous hearings as to
the so-called foreign corporate payments problem. Testimony at these hearings was given
by, among others, representatives from the Department of State, Department of Defense,
Department of Justice, Department of Commerce, Department of the Treasury, and the
Securities and Exchange Commission. Testimony was also given by, among others,
lawyers, law professors, the American Bar Association, other bar association committees,
industry groups, and public interest groups, all of whom also submitted material found in
the legislative record.").
53. MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY: HEARINGS
BEFORE THE SuBcoMM. ON MULTINATIONAL CORPS. OF THE S. COMM. ON FOREIGN

RELATIONS, 94th Cong. 1 (1975) (statement of Sen. Frank Church, Chairman, Subcomm.
on Multinational Corps., S. Comm. on Foreign Relations).
54. Id. at 1.
55. Id. at 2.
56. THE AcTIVITIES OF AMERICAN MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS ABROAD: HEARINGS
BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON INT'L ECON. POLICY OF THE H. COMM. ON INTL RELATIONS, 94th
Cong. 1 (1975) (statement of Rep. Robert N.C. Nix, Chairman, Subcomm. on Int'l Econ.
Policy, H. Comm. on Int'l Relations).
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FCPA states, "The image of American democracy abroad has been
tarnished. Confidence in the financial integrity of our corporations has
been impaired."" At the same time, the report also contains economic
concerns. The drafters of the report wrote:
Corporate bribery is bad business. In our free market system it is
basic that the sale of products should take place on the basis of price,
quality, and service. Corporate bribery is fundamentally destructive
of this basic tenet. Corporate bribery of foreign officials takes place
primarily to assist corporations in gaining business. Thus foreign
corporate bribery affects the very stability of overseas business.
Foreign corporate bribes also affect our domestic competitive climate
when domestic firms engage in such practices as a substitute for
healthy competition for foreign business.'
The report by the House of Representatives contains similar sentiments.59 In regard to the ethical and foreign policy concerns addressed
by the FCPA, the report states, "The payment of bribes to influence the
acts or decisions of foreign officials, foreign political parties or candidates
for foreign political office is unethical. It is counter to the moral expectations and values of the American public."60 The drafters also wrote:
Corporate bribery . . . creates severe foreign policy problems for the

United States. The revelation of improper payments invariably tends
to embarrass friendly governments, lower the esteem for the United
States among the citizens of foreign nations, and lend credence to the
suspicions sown by foreign opponents of the United States that
American enterprises exert a corrupting influence on the political
processes of their nations.61
At the same time, the drafters of the report were also cognizant that
economic concerns were implicated. In regard to the bribery of foreign
public officials, they reported,
[Ilt is bad business as well. It erodes public confidence in the integrity
of the free market system. It short-circuits the marketplace by directing business to those companies too inefficient to compete in terms of
price, quality or service, or too lazy to engage in honest salesmanship,
or too intent upon unloading marginal products. In short, it rewards

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

S. REP. No. 95-114, at 3 (1977).
Id. at 4.
H.R. Rep. No. 95-640 (1977).
Id. at 4.
Id. at 5.
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corruption instead of efficiency and puts pressure on ethical enterprises
to lower their standards or risk losing business.6 2
With the multiple and shifting purposes for the FCPA, the enigmatic
nature of this Act, is not surprising.
As detailed in this part, during the development, drafting, passage,
and enactment of the FCPA, the primary animating force behind it
shifted from legalizing business ethics to addressing foreign policy
concerns. Although economic concerns were a constant during the
development, drafting, passage, and enactment of the FCPA, these
economic concerns were mainly domestic, that is, related to the
regulation of securities markets within the United States.6 3 These
economic concerns were always secondary to the ethical and foreign
policy concerns relating to transnational bribery." In fact, as evidenced by the lack of enforcement of the FCPA for the first few decades
of its existence, even those business ethics and foreign policy concerns
were limited based on the relatively few actions brought under the
FCPA."5
For the FCPA to reach its current prominence and to become
meaningful international trade regulation, the primary animating
reasons for FCPA enforcement would have to change again from those
based upon business ethics and foreign policy concerns to those based
upon international economic efficiency and support for the rule of law
around the globe. In short, the world would have to change, and, based
on the dramatic globalization that has occurred in the past few decades
and the rapid development of transnational anti-corruption law around
the world, it has.

C. The Current InternationalArchitecture of 1RansnationalAntiCorruptionLaw
To understand why the FCPA and other transnational anti-corruption
laws should be viewed as international trade regulation, some explanation should be given as to the recent, dramatic development of transna-

62. Id. at 4-5.
63. See supranotes 41-44 and accompanying text (reporting that the FCPA originated
from concerns about how publicly traded companies in the United States were recording
questionable foreign payments in their books and records and how this might impact
investors and securities markets in the United States).
64. See Koehler, supra note 52, at 938.
65. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing the "quiet" period that
occurred after the passage of the FCPA and before the 2000s in which the anti-bribery
provisions of the FCPA were seldom enforced).
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tional anti-corruption regulation around the globe. 66 As previously
mentioned, when Congress enacted the FCPA in 1977, it was the first
statute of its kind in the world.
Due to a variety of international
agreements and an interest in fighting corruption generally, a myriad of
similar statutes have bloomed around the world. In this part, the
international agreements that have fueled the spread of transnational
anti-corruption law will be discussed.
On March 29, 1996, member states of the Organization of American
States began adopting the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption (IACAC)," which was the first international agreement designed
to fight transnational corruption.69 In the preamble, the IACAC states,
"[Clorruption undermines the legitimacy of public institutions and
strikes at society, moral order and justice, as well as at the comprehensive development of peoples," which acknowledges the ethical concerns
relating to corruption.o It also notes, "[Flighting corruption strengthens democratic institutions and prevents distortions in the economy,
improprieties in public administration and damage to a society's moral
fiber," which acknowledges the threat to the rule of law and economic
efficiency posed by corruption.7 ' Article VIII mandates that parties to
the agreement prohibit and punish transnational bribery.72
On May 26, 1997, the European Union adopted the first major anticorruption agreement among European nations by adopting the
Convention on the Fight Against Corruption Involving Officials of the
European Communities or Officials of Member States of the European

66. Elsewhere, I have charted the rise of and the need for a robust and comprehensive
system of global anti-corruption regulation. See generally Eric C. Chaffee, The Role of the
ForeignCorruptPracticesAct and OtherTransnationalAnti-CorruptionLaws in Preventing
or Lessening FutureFinancialCrises, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1283 (2012). The discussion in this
section will be limited and is focused on explaining why the FCPA and other transnational
anti-corruption laws should be viewed as a part of international trade regulation.
67. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
68. Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention Against Corruption,
Mar. 29, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 724 [hereinafter IACAC].
69. Edmundo Vargas Carrefto, The Inter-American Convention Against Corruption,
Conference, INTERAMERICAN DEv. BANK (May 2000), http://www.iadb.org/leg/Documents/
corrupcin%20 Carreo%20Eng.pdf.
70. IACAC, supra note 68, at pmbl.
71. Id.
72. Id. at art. VIII ("[Elach State Party shall prohibit and punish the offering or
granting, directly or indirectly, by its nationals, persons having their habitual residence
in its territory, and businesses domiciled there, to a government official of another State,
of any article of monetary value, or other benefit, such as a gift, favor, promise or
advantage, in connection with any economic or commercial transaction in exchange for any
act or omission in the performance of that official's public functions.").
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Union (European Convention)." The European Convention is designed
in part to fight transnational corruption.14 It requires member states
of the European Union to criminalize both passive and active corrupPassive corruption occurs when a public official directly or
tion.
indirectly requests or receives a bribe," and active corruption occurs
when a person or entity directly or indirectly gives or promises a
bribe." Importantly, "official" is defined in the European Convention
to include "any national official of another Member State," which means
that the convention mandates member states of the European Union to
criminalize transnational bribery."
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions, which is popularly known as the
"OECD Anti-Bribery Convention," was signed in December 1997.79 The
preamble to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention states the evils of
corruption, including "that bribery is a widespread phenomenon in
international business transactions, including trade and investment,
which raises serious moral and political concerns, undermines good
governance and economic development, and distorts international
competitive conditions."'
The Convention mandates that countries
ratifying it adopt laws similar to the FCPA.a2 Article 1 requires
nations ratifying the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention to adopt laws

73. Convention on the Fight Against Corruption Involving Officials of the European
Communities or Officials of Member States of the European Union, May 26, 1997, 1997
O.J. (C 195) 1.
74. Id. at pmbl.
75. Id. at arts. 2, 3.
76. Id. at art. 2, para. 1 ("For the purposes of this Convention, the deliberate action of
an official, who, directly or through an intermediary, requests or receives advantages of any
kind whatsoever, for himself or for a third party, or accepts a promise of such an
advantage, to act or refrain from acting in accordance with his duty or in the exercise of
his functions in breach of his official duties shall constitute passive corruption.").
77. Id. at art. 3, para. 1 ("For the purposes of this Convention, the deliberate action of
whosoever promises or gives, directly or through an intermediary, an advantage of any
kind whatsoever to an official for himself or for a third party for him to act or refrain from
acting in accordance with his duty or in the exercise of his functions in breach of his official
duties shall constitute active corruption.").
78. See id. at art. 1.
79. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Dec.
17, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 [hereinafter OECD Anti-Bribery Convention].
80. Id. at pmbl.
81. Id.
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criminalizing transnational bribery, 2 and Article 8 requires nations
ratifying the Convention to adopt laws and regulations mandating that
companies keep accurate books and records, make accurate financial
statement disclosures, and comply with relevant accounting and auditing
standards.' As of March 2009, all members of the OECD had ratified
the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention." Moreover, six additional nations
have also adopted the Anti-Bribery Convention: Argentina, Brazil,
Bulgaria, Colombia, Russia, and South Africa.'
The OECD AntiBribery Convention is especially significant because the membership of
the OECD includes many of the most economically powerful nations in
the world.'
On January 27, 1999, the Council of Europe adopted the Criminal Law
Convention on Corruption87 and extended the obligation to fight

82. Id. at art. 1, para. 1 ("Each Party shall take such measures as may be necessary
to establish that it is a criminal offence under its law for any person intentionally to offer,
promise or give any undue pecuniary or other advantage, whether directly or through
intermediaries, to a foreign public official, for that official or for a third party, in order that
the official act or refrain from acting in relation to the performance of official duties, in
order to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage in the conduct of
international business."); id. at art. 1, para. 2 ("Each Party shall take any measures
necessary to establish that complicity in, including incitement, aiding and abetting, or
authorisation of an act of bribery of a foreign public official shall be a criminal offence.
Attempt and conspiracy to bribe a foreign public official shall be criminal offences to the
same extent as attempt and conspiracy to bribe a public official of that Party.").
83. Id. at art. 8, para. 1 ("In order to combat bribery of foreign public officials
effectively, each Party shall take such measures as may be necessary, within the
framework of its laws and regulations regarding the maintenance of books and records,
financial statement disclosures, and accounting and auditing standards, to prohibit the
establishment of off-the-books accounts, the making of off-the-books or inadequately
identified transactions, the recording of non-existent expenditures, the entry of liabilities
with incorrect identification of their object, as well as the use of false documents, by
companies subject to those laws and regulations, for the purpose of bribing foreign public
officials or of hiding such bribery.").
84. See Ratification Status as of 20 November 2012, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION &
DEV., http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/13/40272933.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2013)
(providing a list of the date of ratification, the date of entry into force of the OECD AntiBribery Convention, and the date of entry into force of the implementing legislation for all
countries ratifying the Convention).
85. Id.
86. Id. (providing a list of the thirty-four members of the OECD, which include
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea,
Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak
Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the
United States).
87. Council of Europe, Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, Jan. 27, 1999, 38
I.L.M. 505 [hereinafter Criminal Law Convention on Corruption].
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corruption to a larger number of European nations than just those
composing the European Union." As stated in the preamble, the
Council of Europe adopted the Convention based on the belief "that
corruption threatens the rule of law, democracy and human rights,
undermines good governance, fairness and social justice, distorts
competition, hinders economic development and endangers the stability
of democratic institutions and the moral foundations of society."' The
Criminal Law Convention on Corruption mandates that parties
criminalize active and passive bribery relating to foreign public officials
and foreign public assemblies.90 The Convention also mandates the
criminalization of bribery in regard to various international bodies,
including active and passive bribery relating to officials of international
organizations, 91 members of international parliamentary assemblies,92
and judges and officials of international courts. 93
On November 4, 1999, the Council of Europe acted again to fight
corruption by adopting the Civil Law Convention on Corruption." The
preamble memorializes the Council of Europe's belief "that corruption
represents a major threat to the rule of law, democracy and human
rights, fairness and social justice, hinders economic development and
endangers the proper and fair functioning of market economies."' The
Civil Law Convention on Corruption requires that parties to the
agreement adopt civil remedies for those who have suffered injuries as
a result of corruption so that they can be compensated for their
injuries.9
During this period, the United Nations also began showing a strong
interest in fighting corruption. On November 15, 2000, the General

88. See generally id.
89. Id. at pmbl.
90. Id. at art. 5 (mandating the criminalization of active and passive bribery relating
to the bribery of foreign government officials); id. at art 6. (mandating the criminalization
of active and passive bribery relating to members of foreign public assemblies).
91. Id. at art. 9 (mandating the criminalization of active and passive bribery relating
to officials of international organizations).
92. Id. at art. 10 (mandating the criminalization of active and passive bribery relating
to members of international parliamentary assemblies).
93. Id. at art. 11 (mandating the criminalization of active and passive bribery relating
to judges and officials of international courts).
94. Council of Europe, Civil Law Convention on Corruption, Nov. 4, 1999, E.T.S. No.
174 [hereinafter Civil Law Convention on Corruption].
95. Id. at pmbl.
96. Id. at art. 1 ("Each Party shall provide in its internal law for effective remedies for
persons who have suffered damage as a result of acts of corruption, to enable them to
defend their rights and interests, including the possibility of obtaining compensation for
damage.").
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Assembly adopted by resolution the United Nations Convention Against
Transnational Organized Crime.9 7 As stated in the resolution, the
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime was drafted to
"constitute an effective tool and the necessary legal framework for
international cooperation in combating, inter alia, such criminal
activities as ... corruption." 8 In addition, drafters stated that the
United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime was
designed to address "the negative economic and social implications
related to organized criminal activities, and . .. to strengthen cooperation to prevent and combat such activities more effectively at the
national, regional and international levels."" The Convention contains
provisions requiring the criminalization of some forms of domestic
corruption. 00 Notably, however, the Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime does not take a strong stance against transnational
corruption and mandates only that "[elach State Party shall consider
adopting such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to
establish as criminal offences conduct . .. involving [bribery ofi a foreign
public official or international civil servant."'o
The Convention
Against Transnational Organized Crime requires that "each State Party
shall consider establishing as criminal offences other forms of corruption,"'02 and that parties take "effective action" against corruption.'03
However, it contains no clear mandate to criminalize and punish
transnational corruption." This weakness of the Convention Against

97. United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, Nov. 15,
2000, 2225 U.N.T.S. 209; see also G.A. Res. 55/25, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/25 (Jan. 1, 2001)
(providing the resolution by the United Nations General Assembly on November 15, 2000
adopting the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime).
98. GA. Res. 55/25, supra note 97, at 2.
99. Id.
100. See United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, supra
note 97, at art. 8, para. 1(a) ("Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other
measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences, when committed
intentionally: . .. The promise, offering or giving to a public official, directly or indirectly,
of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in
order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official
duties."); id. at art. 8, para. 1(b) ("Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other
measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences, when committed
intentionally: . . . The solicitation or acceptance by a public official, directly or indirectly,
of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in
order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official
duties.").
101. Id. at art. 8, para. 2.
102. Id.
103. Id. at art. 9, para. 2.
104. See generally id.
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Transnational Organized Crime was apparent at the time of its
adoption, and almost immediately after its adoption, the United Nations
began discussing how to better address corruption occurring around the
globe. 05
At the same time, various regional organizations in Africa became
interested in fighting corruption. On December 21, 2001, the Economic
Community of West African States adopted the Protocol on the Fight
Against Corruption.' 06 As stated in the preamble, the Protocol on the
Fight Against Corruption resulted from the Economic Community of
West African States being "[clonscious of the grave consequences of
corruption on investment, economic growth and democracy."o'07 The
Protocol makes explicit that parties have an obligation to prohibit and
In addition, it requires parties to
punish transnational bribery.'
review their existing laws to determine the effectiveness of those laws
in fighting transnational corruption and to take measures as needed to
improve their laws to prevent the bribery of foreign officials.'
The
Protocol also requires for purposes of preventing corruption that
companies maintain accurate books and records and adhere to internationally accepted accounting standards."o Notably, this Protocol was
supposed to enter into force only upon ratification by nine signatory
states,"' and as of the time of the writing of this Article, sufficient
ratification had not yet occurred." 2

105. See G.A. Res. 55/61, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/61 (Jan. 22, 2001) (containing the
United Nations General Counsel's resolution mandating the creation of an ad hoc
committee to explore the creation of an "effective international legal instrument against
corruption").
106. Economic Community of West African States Protocol on the Fight Against
Corruption, Dec. 21, 2001, available at http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/treaty/
ECOWAS ProtocolonCorruption.pdf [hereinafter West African Protocol].
107. Id. at pmbl.
108. Id. at art. 12, para. 1 ("Each State Party shall prohibit and punish the act of
offering or giving to a foreign public official, either directly or indirectly, any object of
pecuniary value such as gifts, promises or favors, to compensate the public official for an
act or an omission in the exercise of his official functions.").
109. Id. at art. 4, para. 3 ("Each State Party shall review its legislation with a view to
ascertaining whether its current basis for jurisdiction is effective in the fight against the
bribery of foreign public officials, and where it is not, it shall take appropriate remedial
measures.").
110. Id. at art. 5.
111. Id. at art. 22.
112.

InternationalConventions, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEv., http*//www.

oecd.org/cleangovbiz/internationalconventions.htm#africa (last visited Jan. 13, 2014)
(reporting that the Economic Community of West African States Protocol on the Fight
Against Corruption has not yet entered into force because of a lack of adequate
ratification).
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On August 14, 2001, the Southern African Development Community
(SADC) adopted the SADC Protocol Against Corruption."' As stated
in its preamble, the purpose of the Protocol is to address "the adverse
and destabilising effects of corruption throughout the world on the
cultur[al], economic, social and political foundations of society.""' The
SADC Protocol Against Corruption mandates that parties prohibit and
punish acts of transnational bribery."' The Protocol also mandates
that parties adopt laws and regulations that require companies to keep
accurate books and records and to maintain adequate internal accounting controls."6
On July 11, 2003, the African Union adopted the Convention on
Preventing and Combating Corruption." 7 As stated in the preamble,
the Convention was adopted to address concerns regarding "the negative
effects of corruption ... on the political, economic, social and cultural
stability of African States and its devastating effects on the economic
and social development of the African peoples.""s The drafters also
acknowledged "that corruption undermines accountability and transparency in the management of public affairs as well as socio-economic
The African Union
development on the continent [of Africal."
Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption mainly focuses on
domestic anti-corruption regulation.'2 0 However, it also requires that
parties criminalize and punish certain types of transnational corruption
that can occur within international trade transactions.' 2'

113. SADC Protocol Against Corruption, Aug. 14, 2001, available at http://www.sadc.
int/files/7913/5292/8361/ProtocoLAgainstCorruption200l.pdf.
114. Id. at pmbl.
115. Id. at art. 6, para. 1 ("Subject to its domestic law, each State Party shall prohibit
and punish the offering or granting, directly or indirectly, by its own nationals, persons
having their habitual residence in its territory, and businesses domiciled there, to an
official of a foreign State, of any article of monetary value, or other benefit, such as a gift,
favour, promise or advantage, in connection with any economic or commercial transaction
in exchange for any act or omission in the performance of that official's public functions.").
116. Id. at art. 4, para. 1.
117. African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, July 11,
2003, 43 I.L.M. 5 [hereinafter Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption].
118. Id. at pmbl.
119. Id.
120. Id. at art. 2.
121. Id. at art. 19, para. 1 ("In the spirit of international cooperation, State Parties
shall ... [clollaborate with countries of origin .. . to criminalise and punish the practice
of secret commissions and other forms of corrupt practices during international trade
transactions.").
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Finally, on October 31, 2003, the United Nations General Assembly
adopted the United Nations Convention Against Corruption.122 The
Convention is a lengthy and complex document that contains provisions
designed to combat a wide variety of corrupt practices. 12 ' As stated in
the preamble, the Convention was drafted based on concerns "about the
seriousness of problems and threats posed by corruption to the stability
and security of societies, undermining the institutions and values of
democracy, ethical values and justice and jeopardizing sustainable
development and the rule of law."" The drafters of the Convention
also note "that corruption is no longer a local matter but a transnational
phenomenon that affects all societies and economies, making international cooperation to prevent and control it essential."125
Within its numerous provisions, the United Nations Convention
Against Corruption mandates that parties adopt laws and regulations
similar to the FCPA. For example, Article 12 requires:
In order to prevent corruption, each State Party shall take such
measures as may be necessary, in accordance with its domestic laws
and regulations regarding the maintenance of books and records,
financial statement disclosures and accounting and auditing standards,
to prohibit the following acts carried out for the purpose of committing
any of the offences established in accordance with this Convention:
(a) The establishment of off-the-books accounts;
(b) The making of off-the-books or inadequately identified transactions;
(c) The recording of non-existent expenditure;
(d) The entry of liabilities with incorrect identification of their
objects;
(e) The use of false documents; and
(f) The intentional destruction of bookkeeping documents earlier
than foreseen by the law.126
In addition, Article 16 of the Convention Against Corruption mandates
that parties criminalize the direct or indirect promise or payment of a
bribe to a foreign public official or official of a public international
organization. 12' Article 16 also requires that parties to the Conven-

122. G.A. Res. 58/4, para. 2-3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/4 (Nov. 21, 2003) (providing the
resolution by the U.N. General Assembly on October 31, 2003 adopting the United Nations
Convention Against Corruption).
123. United Nations Convention Against Corruption, Oct. 31, 2003, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41.
124. Id. at pmbl.
125. Id.
126. Id. at art. 12, para. 3.
127. Id. at art. 16, para. 1. ("Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other
measures as may be necessary to establish as a criminal offence, when committed
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tion consider adopting laws and regulations to criminalize the solicitation or acceptance of bribes by a foreign public official or official of a
public international organization.12
The United Nations Convention Against Corruption is of considerable
significance because of the numerous members of the United Nations.
As of the writing of this Article, the agreement had 140 signatories and
168 parties, which makes it by far the most far-reaching convention to
In addition, the Convention itself is
address corruption to date."
much more extensive than the other international agreements discussed
in this Article because its provisions address a wide-variety of different
forms of corruption.3 o
As a result of these numerous international treaties, transnational
anti-corruption law should meet the definition of international trade
law.'
Professors Chow and Schoenbaum define international trade
law as "the public international law treaties and legal institutions that
constitute the multilateral trading system and the implementation of
these public international law obligations into domestic law."132
Transnational anti-corruption law should be considered a part of
internationaltrade law because of the numerous public international law
treaties regarding corruption. These treaties may not be part of the
traditional definition of the multilateral trading system,as but the
impact of these agreements should render them international trade
regulations. This is because they invariably impact how trade is
conducted because of the treaties mandating that parties create

intentionally, the promise, offering or giving to a foreign public official or an official of a
public international organization, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the
official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain
from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties, in order to obtain or retain business
or other undue advantage in relation to the conduct of international business.").
128. Id. at art. 16, para. 2 ("Each State Party shall consider adopting such legislative
and other measures as may be necessary to establish as a criminal offence, when
committed intentionally, the solicitation or acceptance by a foreign public official or an
official of a public international organization, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage,
for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act
or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties.").
129. See Signatoriesto the UnitedNationsConventionAgainst Corruption,U.N. OFFICE
ON DRUGS & CRIME, http/A/www.unode.org/unodd/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html (last
visited Jan. 13, 2014) (providing a complete list of signatories and parties to the United
Nations Convention Against Corruption).
130. See generally United Nations Convention Against Corruption, supra note 123.
131. See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 19, at 1.
132.

Id.

133. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (providing a definition of multilateral
tradingsystem).
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obligations within their domestic laws not to engage in transnational
corruption. As Chow and Schoenbaum state, "International trade refers
broadly to economic and commercial activities that cross national
boundaries or that have an effect across national boundaries."'
They
continue, "In the modern world, there are four major channels of
international trade: (1) trade in goods, (2) trade in services, (3)
technology transfer, and (4) foreign direct investment.""' With the
breadth of this definition, the notion that transnational anti-corruption
law does not have a substantial impact on how international trade is
regulated is almost laughable. In addition, the numerous public
international law treaties relating to corruption help it to fit even more
easily into the definition of international trade regulation offered by
Chow and Schoenbaum. Although transnational anti-corruption law,
with the passage of the FCPA, may have begun as a vehicle for
legalizing business ethics and addressing foreign policy concerns, the
development of the current global model of transnational anti-corruption
law has transformed it into international trade regulation designed to
promote economic efficiency and the rule of law.
III.

THE IMPORT OF TRANSNATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION LAW AS

INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW

Because the primary purpose of the FCPA and other transnational
anti-corruption laws have transitioned from legalizing business ethics
and addressing foreign policy to regulating international trade in order
to promote economic efficiency and the rule of law, a few words ought to
be said about the importance of this transition. This transition suggests
that the WTO should be playing a more robust role in fighting corruption, the SEC should have a reduced role in FCPA enforcement, and the
world should consider creating an international organization to fight
corruption.
A. The World Trade OrganizationShould Play a More Robust Role
in Fighting Corruption
The fact that transnational corruption is regularly associated with
international trade suggests that the WTO should be doing more to fight
corruption. As previously discussed,s" Professors Chow and Schoenbaum report, "In the modern world, there are four major channels of
international trade: (1) trade in goods, (2) trade in services, (3)

134.
135.

CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 19, at 2.
Id.

136. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
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technology transfer, and (4) foreign direct investment."a' Because of
the breadth of this definition, and because trade is one of the main ways
that parties from different nations interact, corruption is a constant
concern in international trade. As a result, a casual observer might
expect that the WTO would play a leading role in fighting corruption.
Remarkably, since the WTO was established on January 1, 1995,38
it has done little to address corruption,' which is odd considering the
numerous other international organizations that have worked to create
multilateral anti-corruption treaties.o4 0
The WTO's reticence is
especially remarkable because the WTO views the purpose of the international agreements governing multilateral trade as follows:
The . .. overriding purpose [of the agreements governing multilateral

trade] is to help trade flow as freely as possible-so long as there are no
undesirable side effects-because this is important for economic
development and well-being. That partly means removing obstacles.
It also means ensuring that individuals, companies and governments
know what the trade rules are around the world, and giving them the
confidence that there will be no sudden changes of policy. In other
words, the rules have to be transparent and predictable."'
With the WTO's emphasis on transparency in international trade, one
would expect that fighting corruption would be high on the WTO's
agenda.'42 At least one commentator has argued that WTO efforts to
promote transparency generally in international trade regulation are an
indirect means of fighting corruption because they promote better
governance of the nations involved."
In addition, the WTO has

137. CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 19, at 2.
138. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15,
1994, 1867 U.N.T.S 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement], available at http://www.wto
.org/english/docs-e/legale/04-wto.pdf.
139. See Kenneth W. Abbott, Rule-Making in the WTO: Lessons From the Case of
Bribery and Corruption,4 J. INT'L ECoN. L. 275, 278 (2001) (reporting that the WTO has
done little to explicitly address corruption); Padideh Ala'i, The WTO and the AntiCorruptionMovement, 6 LOY. U. CHI. INT'L L. REV. 259, 278 (2008) (discussing the WTO's
limited anti-corruption efforts and suggesting that the WTO could be playing a larger role
in fighting corruption).
140. See Part II.C (discussing numerous international agreements that have been
created with the express purpose of fighting corruption).
141. What Is the WTO? Who We Are, WORLD TRADE ORG., http/www.wto.org/english/
thewto~e/whatise/who_wearee.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2014).
142. See Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 138.
143. See Ala'i, supra note 139, at 260 ("The WTO contributes to the anti-corruption
movement by providing a forum where the problems associated with lack of transparency
and due process in administration or implementation of measures (such as rules, judicial
decisions or administrative rulings) are acknowledged and countries may negotiate for
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established a Working Group on Transparency in Government Procurement that has addressed some anti-corruption issues within its relatively
narrow focus.'" Still, the WTO's efforts are weak at best.
The WTO should be doing more to combat corruption, especially
transnational corruption. Because of the globalization that has occurred
in the past few decades, transnational anti-corruption regulation is
international trade regulation. As a result, the WTO should have a
much louder voice in the anti-corruption fight as a means of promoting
global economic efficiency and the rule of law around the world.

B. Enforcement of the FCPA Anti-Bribery Provisions Should Be
Consolidated in the DOJ
Although the SEC should continue to enforce the provisions of the
FCPA requiring that public companies maintain both accurate books and
records and adequate internal accounting controls, enforcement of the
anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA should be consolidated in the DOJ.
As previously discussed, the SEC and the DOJ have very different
14
mandates."
As stated on the SEC's website, "The mission of the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission is to protect investors, maintain
14
fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.""
This mission emanates from the theory of market regulation based upon
full and fair disclosure that is codified in both the Securities Act and the
Exchange Act.14 ' As stated on the DOJ website, however, the DOJ
views its mission as requiring it:
[tlo enforce the law and defend the interests of the United States
according to the law; to ensure public safety against threats foreign
and domestic; to provide federal leadership in preventing and
controlling crime; to seek just punishment for those guilty of unlawful
behavior; and to ensure fair and impartial administration of justice for
all Americans.148
The DOJ's mission, which is much broader than the SEC's mission,
entails a much wider range of activities, including the enforcement of

detailed transparency-enhancing criteria in specific areas of trade regulation.").
144. See Working Group on Transparency in Government Procurement,WORLD TRADE
ORG., httpl//www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/gproc.elgptran e.htm (last visited Jan. 13,2014).
145. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
146. See What We Do, supra note 7.
147. A.C. Pritchard, The SEC at 70: Time for Retirement?, 80 NoTRE DAME L. REV.
1073, 1088 (2005).
148. See About DOJ, supra note 7.
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domestic anti-corruption provisions."s Yet, the SEC is principally
charged with civil enforcement of the FCPA, and the DOJ is charged
with criminal enforcement. 50
As a result of the purposes of the FCPA and other transnational anticorruption regulations, evolving from an attempt to legalize business
ethics by mandating transparency for purposes of protecting investors
and regulating domestic securities markets to international trade
regulation for purposes of promoting economic efficiency and the rule of
law, both criminal and civil enforcement of the FCPA's anti-bribery
provisions should be vested in the DOJ. The SEC should retain
enforcement power over the provisions requiring companies issuing
securities registered with the SEC to maintain both accurate books and
records and adequate internal accounting controls because those
provisions fit within the SEC's mandate under the Securities Act and the
Exchange Act to promote full and fair disclosure in securities markets."5 ' In addition, the SEC has the knowledge and expertise regarding disclosure to implement these provisions effectively.' Because the
principle purposes for the anti-bribery provisions are no longer investor
protection or the regulation of securities markets, civil and criminal
enforcement of the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions should be vested in
the DOJ. Although enforcement of these provisions could be vested in
some administrative agency in the United States dedicated to addressing

149. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 201(2012) (containing a provision rendering unlawful bribery
of public officials and witnesses). Moreover, federal criminal law contains a variety of other
provisions that can be used creatively to prosecute the corruption of public officials. See
generally Adam Kurland, The GuaranteeClause asa Basis for FederalProsecutionsofState
and Local Officials, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 367, 381-406 (1989) (discussing how various federal
statutes are used for the prosecution of corruption).
150. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text (explaining the division of authority
between the SEC and the DOJ to pursue civilly and criminally those individuals and
entities who violate the provisions of the FCPA).
151. See Pritchard, supranote 147, at 1088 ("The SEC's regulatory strategy reflects the
broad grants of authority to the agency to mandate corporate disclosures under the 1933
and 1934 Acts.").
152. See Colleen M. Baker, Regulating the Invisible: The Case of Over-the-Counter
Derivatives, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1287, 1343 (2010) ("The institutional expertise of the
SEC rests primarily in disclosure, enforcement, and consumer protection."); Jill E. Fisch,
Top Cop or RegulatoryFlop? The SEC at 75, 95 VA. L. REV. 785, 818 (2009) ("Whatever its
flaws, the SEC's expertise in mandating and enforcing disclosure gives it an advantage
over alternative regulators."); Donna M. Nagy & Richard W. Painter, Selective Disclosure
by Federal Officialsand the Case for an FGD (FairerGovernment Disclosure)Regime, 2012
WIs. L. REV. 1285, 1364 (2012) ("Although the SEC should not embroil itself in matters
outside its regulatory mission, its expertise on disclosure issues is an important resource
that could be tapped by other executive agencies or by officials in Congress and the
courts.").
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concerns relating to international trade, the DOJ is the best administrative agency to enforce the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA because
of its knowledge and expertise, including its experience in enforcing
domestic anti-corruption statutes. 153
Other commentators have reached similar conclusions regarding the
FCPA and also suggest that the DOJ should be the body charged with
the civil and criminal enforcement of its anti-bribery provisions. For
example, in her recent article, The SEC and the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act: Fighting Global Corruption is Not Part of the SEC's
Mission," Professor Barbara Black argues "that the SEC should
devote its attention to those activities that are central to its mission ...
to protect investors from securities fraud," and therefore, "[ilt is finally
time to consolidate enforcement of the FCPA in [the] DOJ."5 Professor Black reaches this conclusion by exploring the legislative and
enforcement history of the FCPA, 156 and she ultimately issues "a [clall
to [rieturn to the SEC's [ilnvestor [pirotection [mlission."'
Professor
Black's article is both thoroughly researched and thoughtfully written,
which is especially impressive considering that she included the article
within the word-limit confines of a symposium issue of the Ohio State
Law Journal on the FCPA.s58
The current Article extends and reinforces the position of those who
would consolidate enforcement of the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions in
the DOJ. First, it provides an analysis of how the primary purpose of
the FCPA has dramatically shifted during the course of its three-and-ahalf-decade existence from legalizing business ethics to a statute
supporting global economic efficiency and the rule of law around the
world by being a part of the global system of international trade
regulation.'s The rationales for the FCPA have moved far beyond
mandating transparency on the part of publicly traded companies for
purposes of protecting investors and regulating securities markets.
Second, this Article explains that the world has changed, and that the
FCPA is now part of a global scheme of transnational anti-corruption

153. See generally Black, supra note 8.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1096.
156. See generally id.
157. Id. at 1113.
158. See Symposium, The FCPA at Thirty-Five and Its Impact on Global Business, 73
OHIO ST. L.J. 883 (2012).
159. See supra Part I.B-C (analyzing the evolving and shifting purposes for the
existence of the FCPA).
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law, which also suggests that the anti-bribery provisions are far beyond
the SEC's mandates.'60
As previously mentioned, the consolidation of enforcement of the FCPA
anti-bribery provisions in the DOJ is unlikely, considering the creation
of an FCPA enforcement unit within the SEC in 2010.1"1 Nevertheless,
such a consolidation would be both logical and useful because it would
allow the SEC to pursue its traditional legislative mandates without
being forced to pursue enforcement of a statute that has largely become
a form of international trade regulation.
C. The World Should Contemplate the Creation of an International
Organizationto Create, Monitor,and Enforce Anti-CorruptionLaw
With the WTO failing to take a leadership role in fighting corruption,' and with FCPA enforcement not happily assigned in the United
States,'e the world should contemplate the creation of an international organization to create, monitor, and enforce anti-corruption regulation. Transnational anti-corruption law has evolved from a choice by the
United States to legalize business ethics into international trade
regulation for the purpose of improving global economic efficiency and
supporting the rule of law."e' The current rationales for a robust
global system of anti-corruption regulation are more than sufficient to
warrant the creation of an international organization to lead the fight
against corruption. Although Transparency International has become a
leader in monitoring corruption around the globe,"' international
efforts should be made to form an organization whose primary mission
is to create and enforce anti-corruption regulation.
The need for such an international body has been recognized. Many
of the international agreements discussed earlier in this Article

160. See supra Part II.C (discussing the international agreements that have spread
transnational anti-corruption laws to nations around the world).
161. See SEC Enforcement Actions: FCPA Cases, supra note 9.
162. See supra Part IIA.
163. See supra Part U.B.
164. See supra Part II.
165. See Our Organisation Misson, Vision and Values, TRANSPARENCY INT'L, http*J/
www.transparency.org/whoweare/organisation/mission.yision-andvalues(lastvisitedDec
2, 2013) ("Our Mission is to stop corruption and promote transparency, accountability and
integrity at all levels and across all sectors of society. Our Core Values are: transparency,
accountability, integrity, solidarity, courage, justice and democracy."); Strategy 2015,
TRANSPAENCYINL,http://www.transparency.org/whoweare/organisation/strategy_2015/0/
(reporting that Transparency International has pursued its mission by "rais[ing] awareness
of the devastating effects of corruption and work[ing] with governments, business leaders,
local communities and other civil society organisations to fight against it").

2014]

CORRUPTION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE

729

expressly provide for the creation of international bodies to fight
corruption. 6 6 For example, Article 12 of the OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention provides that implementation and monitoring of the
agreement will be overseen by the OECD Working Group on Bribery in
International Business Transactions."' Similarly, Article 24 of the
Council of Europe's Criminal Law Convention on Corruption requires
that implementation of the agreement be monitored by the Group of
States Against Corruption,' and Article 14 of the Council of Europe's
Civil Law Convention on Corruption requires that implementation of
Article 22 of
that agreement will also be monitored by this Group.'
the African Union's Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption mandates the creation of an Advisory Board on Corruption to
oversee the implementation of the agreement, to counsel the African
Union on corruption issues, and to promote anti-corruption law.'
Finally, Article 63 of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption
requires the establishment of a Conference of States Parties to oversee
the implementation of the agreement."' The creation of all of these
international bodies to fight corruption suggests the need for a more
robust international body to not only monitor anti-corruption activities,
but also to create and enforce anti-corruption regulation as needed.' 72

166. See supra Part II.C (discussing various international agreements to fight
corruption).
167. OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 79, at art. 12.
168. Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, supra note 87, at art. 24.
169. Civil Law Convention on Corruption, supra note 94, at art. 14.
170. Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, supra note 117, at art. 22.
171. United Nations Convention Against Corruption, supra note 123, at art. 63.
172. In addition, the creation of such an international body to promulgate, monitor, and
enforce anti-corruption regulation would give the world an opportunity to experiment with
globalization of securities regulation. Elsewhere, I have written extensively on the benefits
of the harmonization and centralization of securities regulation. See generally Eric C.
Chaffee, Contemplatingthe Endgame: An EvolutionaryModel for the Harmonizationand
Centralizationof InternationalSecurities Regulation, 79 U. CIN. L. REv. 587 (2010); Eric
C. Chaffee, Finishing the Race to the Bottom: An Argument for the Harmonizationand
Centralizationof InternationalSecurities Law, 40 SETON HALL L. REv. 1581 (2010); Eric
C. Chaffee, The Internationalization of Securities Regulation: The United States
Governments Role in Regulating the Global CapitalMarkets, 5 J. BuS. & TECH. L. 187
(2010); Eric C. Chaffee, A Moment of Opportunity: Reimagining InternationalSecurities
Regulation in the Shadow of Financial Crisis, 15 NEXUS 29 (2010). Although anticorruption regulation is not exclusively designed to preserve the integrity of securities
markets, certain commonly used anti-corruption measures do have significant implications
for market regulation, such as the requirements that publicly held companies maintain
both accurate books and records and adequate internal accounting controls. See supra Part
I (discussing the enigmatic nature of the FCPA and reporting the strong link between the
FCPA and securities law). If international harmonization and centralization of securities
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Due to space limitations, the creation, powers, and operation of such
an international body will not be discussed within the pages of this
Article. Because of the importance of anti-corruption regulation in
international trade, in global economic efficiency, and in supporting the
rule of law, however, the world should be contemplating the creation of
an international organization to create, monitor, and enforce anticorruption regulation.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The primary justifications for transnational anti-corruption law have
evolved from legalizing business ethics to supporting global economic
efficiency and the rule of law through the regulation of international
trade.'
Although politicians and practitioners understand that
transnational anti-corruption law is international trade regulation,"
the legal academy has failed to fully embrace this reality.7 ' As a
result, the legal academy should be doing more to teach, analyze, and
discuss transnational anti-corruption law as international trade
regulation. In addition, the academy should be doing more to fuel the

law is ever to occur, it will likely have to occur in stages during a long, evolutionary
process. Opportunities to move toward greater harmonization and centralization have been
missed in the past. See Eric C. Chaffee, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act: A Failed Vision for Increasing Consumer Protection and
HeighteningCorporateResponsibility in InternationalFinancialTransactions,60 AM. U.
L. REv. 1431 (2011). The creation of a body to promulgate, monitor, and enforce anticorruption regulation would be a positive step toward such harmonization and centralization. In other contexts, I have argued for a wait-and-see approach to creating international
entities to address securities regulation issues, especially in contexts in which a particular
industry involving securities may be in its infancy. See generally Eric C. Chaffee &
Geoffrey C. Rapp, RegulatingOn-line Peer-to-PeerLending in the Aftermath ofDodd-Frank:
In Search of an Evolving Regulatory Regime for an Evolving Industry, 69 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 485 (2012). As discussed elsewhere in this Article, however, transnational anticorruption regulation has reached maturity, and the creation of an international body
would be a logical next step. See supra Part II (discussing the development of transnational anti-corruption regulation around the globe).
173. See supra Part II (discussing the evolution of transnational anti-corruption law
from legalized business ethics to international trade regulation).
174.

See JOEL C. WLIAMS JR., RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW

(2012) (providing a thoughtful and concise discussion of international trade law, including
a discussion of the FCPA and other transnational anti-corruption statutes); supraPart II.C
(discussing the numerous international agreements designed to fight corruption that
politicians have negotiated based in part on economic concerns relating to corruption in
international trade).
175. See supra Part I (reporting on the legal academy's difficulty in determining where
to incorporate the FCPA and other transnational anti-corruption statutes into law school
curricula).
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development of policy and theory regarding transnational anti-corruption
law as international trade regulation, especially regarding the need for
increased efforts by the WTO to fight corruption,176 the need to
consolidate enforcement of the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA in the
DOJ,'77 and the need for the creation of an international body to
oversee the development and enforcement of transnational anticorruption law.178

176. See supra Part I.A (discussing the WTO's lackluster efforts to directly confront
the issues associated with transnational corruption).
177. See supra Part Il.B (discussing the need to consolidate both civil and criminal
enforcement of the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions in the DOJ).
178. See supra Part I.C (arguing for the creation of an international body to be
responsible for the promulgation, monitoring, and enforcement of anti-corruption
regulation).
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